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W. E. B. Du Bois, Black agency 
and the slaves’ Civil War
By Brian Kelly
For most of the century and a half that has passed since the end of the US Civil War, the four mil-lion African Americans held as slaves in the 
Confederate South were wrien out of any meaningful 
role in their own emancipation. “e American ne-
groes are the only people in the history of the world 
that ever became free without any eort of their own,” 
one widely read biographer wrote in 1928. “ey had 
not started the war nor ended it, [but] twanged banjos 
around the railroad stations, sang melodious spirituals, 
and believed that some Yankee would soon come along 
and give each of them forty acres and a mule.”1 
is was a deliberately oensive rendering, but 
there was nothing that marked it o from the main-
stream consensus on Black “passivity” forged in the 
crucible of late nineteenth-century white supremacy. 
Some historians acknowledged that slavery had been 
the cause of the conict, but across the whole spectrum 
of “respectable” opinion, commentators agreed that 
the slaves had remained unmoved by the convulsions 
of war, and that freedom had been delivered to them in
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an act of Yankee benevolence. e capitalist-turned patrician historian James 
Ford Rhodes argued that “the blacks made no move to rise” and “remained pa-
tiently submissive and faithful to their owners,”2 but even this was not enough 
for some. Virginia-born Woodrow Wilson—then a professor at Princeton—
derided Rhodes for his alleged “abolitionist prejudices,”3 and the cohort of 
academics gathering around Columbia University’s William A. Dunning and 
his collaborator John W. Burgess labored night and day to permanently in-
scribe their reactionary interpretation of the war into the historical record.4 
In neglecting slave self-activity, liberals were indistinguishable from 
the most enthusiastic Confederate apologists. Oen credited with breaking 
from the agrant white supremacy of the Dunning School, Francis B. Sim-
kins and Robert H. Woody asserted in their South Carolina study the “re-
markable fact that during the war the blacks manifested no general desire 
to be free”—even while acknowledging, in the same breath, the execution 
of “twenty-seven negro insurrectionists” by Confederate scouts north of 
Charleston. Except for “a few [who] ed to Union lines,” they wrote, slaves 
“remained faithful to their masters”; freedom had been “forced on them by 
abolitionist troops.”5 
e turn-of-the-century US Le was too weak and politically undevel-
oped to counter this bourgeois consensus on slave passivity. Leists pub-
lished lile of any real value on America’s revolutionary past, and almost 
nothing worth reading on racism. Partly this reected the prominent role 
of immigrant radicals unfamiliar with this history in the ranks of the Social-
ist Party (SP) and the most militant workers’ organizations of the time. But 
the failure also reected the SP’s “broad-church” approach to organization, 
which pushed it toward accommodating rather than openly challenging 
white supremacy. Its southern branches built a sometimes impressive fol-
lowing on the ruins of the defeated Populist Party, drawing members from 
across the color line, but the SP had nothing to say on the specic problems 
confronting Black workers during the brutal formative years of Jim Crow. In 
practice it combined abstract propaganda about the need for class unity with 
acquiescence to the racial status quo. In rejecting politics of any stripe, the 
revolutionary syndicalists of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) le 
themselves open to the same weakness: they led some of the most militant 
interracial labor struggles of the period and, at times, adopted a principled 
stand against lynching and racial violence, but didn’t see the need for a con-
certed aempt to win their white membership to a principled position on 
the “race question.” Both organizations included segregationists on one end, 
who did not challenge the doctrine of “race inferiority” underpinning Jim 
Crow, and a principled minority on the other who perceived but did not yet 
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consistently articulate the need to combat the poisonous eects of racism on 
working-class organization. 
Some early American Marxists—particularly among the German im-
migrant community—grasped the revolutionary character of the Civil War, 
but the SP viewed the conict, retrospectively, not as the most profound so-
cial upheaval in US history, but as an elaborate ruse put over on workers by 
northern capital. is was a tragic, and costly, misreading of the past. e 
contortions it produced can be seen in James Oneal’s e Workers in Ameri-
can History, where he wrote (inaccurately) that northern labor opposed the 
war6 because “they felt that division along sectional lines delayed the com-
ing solidarity of all workers North and South.” In Class Struggles in America, 
Algie Martin Simons argued that the antislavery character of the war was “a 
tale invented almost a decade aer the war . . . as a means of glorifying the 
[Republican] party of plutocracy and maintaining its supremacy.” Citing 
Rhodes, Simons wrote that the slave’s “failure to play any part in the struggle 
that broke his shackles told the world that he was not of those who to free 
themselves would strike a blow.”7 In denying the slaves any role in emanci-
pation and reducing the war to a scheme for capitalist expansion, Simons 
anticipated the economic determinist approach of the Progressive historian 
Charles Beard, giving encouragement to the tendency among white radicals 
to downplay both the centrality of slavery in the nation’s past and the urgent 
need to confront racism in the present. Although dressed up in the language 
of class struggle, this was not Marxist historiography but rank capitulation to 
the racist “common sense” saturating Jim Crow America.
Du Bois and the assault on racist orthodoxy
A handful of African Americans and white le-wing scholar activists had 
challenged the prevailing assessment of the war and its aermath, but until 
the publication of   W. E. B. Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction in America in 1935, 
their work made no real impact on popular consciousness. Du Bois was not 
exaggerating when he claimed that his work was an aempt to shake up a 
eld marked by “endless sympathy with the white South . . . ridicule, con-
tempt or silence for the Negro [and] a judicial aitude towards the North.” 
He confronted a scholarly and popular consensus steeped in racist “propa-
ganda” and underpinned by “a deliberate aempt so to change the facts of 
history that the story will make pleasant reading for [white] Americans.”8 
Du Bois’s withering assault on this racist orthodoxy remains, eighty years 
later, the most intellectually courageous intervention in all of American his-
torical writing. Foregrounding the relationship between the rise of antislavery 
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and changing American political economy during a period of acute transfor-
mation, Black Reconstruction is comprehensive in its reinterpretation of the 
war and the period of Reconstruction that followed. Its coherence rests on 
a framework both deeply inuenced by Marx’s understanding of history and 
the product of class struggle. Although some former allies branded him a 
“racialist” for breaking with the color-blind orthodoxy then dominating the 
US Le, the charge was absurd: Du Bois was clear that class conict was 
key to explaining Reconstruction’s failure. “Beneath the race issue, and un-
consciously of more fundamental weight,” he insisted, “was the economic issue. 
[Opponents of Black equality] were seeking [aer the war] to reestablish the 
domination of property in Southern politics.” Finally, Du Bois understood 
US slave emancipation in global terms, as a key episode in the wider devel-
oping confrontation between the small minority that controlled the world’s 
wealth—based “in London and Paris, Berlin and Rome, New York and Rio 
de Janeiro”—and “the dark and vast sea of human labor . . . that great majority 
of mankind . . . despised [on account of] race and color, paid a wage below 
the level of decent living.”9 
Even taking into account these many strengths, the book’s most sig-
nicant contribution was its unconcealed celebration of Black agency. 
Against every “respectable” commentator who wrote o the slaves as active 
agents in their own emancipation, Du Bois placed them at the epicenter of 
world-changing events. It was, he insisted, a “general strike against slavery” 
that transformed the character of the war, undermined the Confederacy’s 
ability to ght, and saved the Union.10 An obvious aempt to counter the 
malicious racism that had rendered the slaves as an inert mass, almost im-
mediately the concept of the “slaves’ general strike” became the focus of con-
troversy, generating a debate that has not always done justice to the nuance 
of Du Bois’s argument, and which has frequently lost sight of the context in 
which the book came to see the light of day. 
Without question, Du Bois emphasized the transformative power of 
slave initiative in “decid[ing] the war.” But he set his own interpretation o 
against “two theories, both over-elaborated”: one suggesting that “the slave 
did nothing but faithfully serve his master until emancipation was thrust 
upon him; the other that the Negro immediately . . . le serfdom and took 
his stand with the Army of freedom.” Instead, Du Bois insisted, “What the 
Negro did was to wait, look and listen. As soon as it became clear that the 
Union armies would not or could not return fugitive slaves, and that the mas-
ters with all their fume and fury were uncertain of victory, the slave entered 
upon a general strike.” Signicantly, he countered the Confederate assertion 
of universal slave loyalty not with its opposite—ubiquitous resistance—but 
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with a nuanced survey of a varied and uneven slave experience during war-
time, one that evolved in close correlation with political and military calcu-
lations made at Richmond and Washington, and on baleelds scaered 
across the wartime South. It was the “Negroes of the cities, Negroes who 
were being hired out, Negroes of intelligence who could read and write,” Du 
Bois suggested, who began “carefully to watch the situation,” while the vast 
majority (ten to one, by his count)—those “le on the untouched and inac-
cessible plantations”—bided their time.11
At the time Black Reconstruction came into print, some critics dismissed 
Du Bois’s notion of the “slaves’ general strike” as an aempt to impose con-
scious purpose and coherent form on the routine dislocations of war and 
episodes of spontaneous ight. With all of his “persuasive eloquence and lit-
erary power,” Abram L. Harris wrote, it was “impossible” for Du Bois “to con-
vert the wholesale ight of Negroes . . . into a general strike.” Osvald Garrison 
Villard, with Du Bois one of the co-founders of the NAACP, complained 
that “in portraying the [ight] of the Negro during the war . . . as a sort of 
conscious general strike” rather than the “natural, unconscious, unorganized 
dri of embaled and endangered masses in the direction of freedom and 
safety,” Du Bois had overstepped “historic bounds.” If the slaves had not 
been completely passive in the eyes of liberal critics, neither did they inter-
vene consciously to tip the scales toward freedom.12
Over the past generation, with Du Bois’s perspective driving a funda-
mental reappraisal of the war and its aermath, the most general proposition 
underlying his notion of the slave’s general strike—that Black self-assertion 
played a central role in transforming the war—is widely accepted. If we un-
derstand (in his biographer David Levering Lewis’s words) “Du Bois’s general 
strike amount[ing] to lile more than the common sense of self-preservation 
exhibited on a massive scale,”13 then there are few historians who would 
dissent. But Du Bois was clearly aiming to demonstrate something beyond 
“self-preservation,” stressing the conscious aspect of the slaves’ intervention in 
history and framing the disintegration of slavery as a major episode of class 
conict. is, too, can be taken too far: some of the more celebratory studies 
of the slaves’ Civil War exaggerate their room for maneuver, reading Du Bois 
dogmatically and overlooking the unevenness in slave consciousness and cir-
cumstance to which he was closely auned. Men and women make history, 
aer all, but rarely in the conditions they choose, and never in history have 
agency and constraint rubbed up against one another more dramatically than 
in the predicament facing slaves in the wartime South. 
Du Bois was neither the rst nor the only student of the period to 
recognize the slaves’ agency. Two years before Black Reconstruction went 
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to print, supporters of the Trotskyist Le Opposition in the United States 
published Communism and the Negro, a pamphlet that argued, “e Negroes 
of the South were the decisive force in re-establishing the national unity of 
the country.”14 One of the few worthwhile appraisals of Black Reconstruction 
from a Marxist perspective, wrien by C. L. R. James’s close collaborator 
Morris Goelman for the Trotskyist Fourth International in 1950, acknowl-
edged Du Bois’s theoretical advance without geing tied down by a rigid 
literalism or being driven to overstate slave agency. Especially in his chapter 
on the general strike, Goelman wrote, Du Bois was “seeking an historical 
anticipation of the modern proletariat in the Civil War Negro.” Whatever 
“errors and exaggerations” he made merely “underscore[d] the extent of his 
eort to incorporate the Negro into modern proletarian history.” is was an 
advance that Goelman celebrated, and one for which we are deeply indebted 
to Du Bois. e force of his argument lay in Du Bois’s depiction of wartime 
slave mobilization
not as the ight of a broken people, but as a purposeful weakening and paralysis 
of [the] Southern economy, as the necessary prelude to its fundamental recon-
struction. is was part of a larger conception that the Negro in the South was 
not simply a long-suering but essentially a revolutionary laboring class which 
aempted “prematurely” to remake Southern society.15
In highlighting the leading role of the slaves in shaping the outcome of 
the war and casting their wartime upheaval as a critical chapter in the history 
of the US working class, Du Bois pioneered a new interpretive framework 
that has recongured our understanding of the Civil War.  But Du Bois in-
tended Black Reconstruction as an interpretive demolition job on racist his-
torical writing, and while he read widely in the dismal “scholarship” churned 
out to downplay the centrality of emancipation, the book involved almost 
no research in source materials. It’s doubtful whether Du Bois could have 
gone that route even if he’d wanted to: even as late as the mid-1950s, African 
American historian John Hope Franklin found himself excluded from archi-
val collections across the Jim Crow South or forced to work in segregated 
side rooms as he labored on his own history of Reconstruction.16 But eighty 
years aer Du Bois’s aempt to reposition the slaves as agents of their own 
freedom and more than a generation aer the upheaval of the 1960s inspired 
a turn to “history from below,” historians have by now excavated a rich doc-
umentary base for assessing wartime Black agency. is cumulative record 
buries, once and for all, the myth of the passive slave, even as it allows a more 
precise calibration of the conceptual framework pioneered by Du Bois.
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The slaves’ politics
Crucially, we now know that although they were excluded from formal pol-
itics, slaves in many parts of the South were engaged in various forms of 
antislavery agitation during the period leading up to the war, and that their 
engagement accelerated as the national crisis over slavery intensied in the 
1850s. James Oakes argued that in their frequent decision to take ight from 
the plantations, slave runaways forced the issue of slavery onto the national 
agenda, provoking deep and growing antagonism between the North and 
the South over the return of “fugitive” slaves, the passing of personal lib-
erty laws, and the enlistment of the federal government in the business of 
slave-hunting. Communities of escaped slaves and free Blacks—forced to 
confront deeply entrenched racism in the “free” North—were not a mere 
appendage to northern abolitionism, but formed the backbone of the un-
derground railroad, and were centrally involved in every aspect of organizing 
and internal debate within the antislavery ranks. e “driving force” in the 
formative phase of northern abolition, C. L. R. James asserted more than a 
half century ago, was the “insurrectionary slave and the free Negro in opposi-
tion to the Southern slave-owner.”17 Comparing northern selements of fu-
gitive slaves and free Blacks to maroon communities in other slave societies, 
Steven Hahn writes that northern Blacks “did the hard work of developing 
and sustaining radical abolition . . . [keeping] the emancipation process alive 
and deepen[ing] the crisis of the Union.”18 
On top of day-to-day resistance—the routine acts of deance that af-
fected virtually every plantation—the slave South saw four major aempts 
at organized rebellion in the nineteenth century. In Virginia in 1800 the slave 
Gabriel—a skilled blacksmith “hired out” in Richmond, where he worked 
and socialized alongside white artisans radicalized by the French Revolu-
tion and was himself inspired by the slave revolt in Haiti—ploed to over-
turn the slave system, but his plans were betrayed by informers. Just over a 
decade later, in 1811, the Louisiana sugar parishes were the site of another 
major revolt, once more deeply connected to slave unrest in Haiti and the 
Caribbean. ere the uprising came very close “to conquering New Orleans 
and establishing a black Republic on the shores of the Mississippi” before 
planters gained the upper hand.19 In Charleston in 1821 whites uncovered a 
major conspiracy involving perhaps hundreds of slaves and free Blacks led by 
Denmark Vesey. Like Gabriel, Vesey was a literate and charismatic skilled ar-
tisan of “imposing intellect,” formerly a slave but now free, and an inuential 
“class leader” in the city’s AME church. Ten years later Nat Turner—a “gied” 
slave preacher dubbed “the prophet” by those around him—claimed to have 
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received a message from God that he should “slay [his] enemies with their 
own weapons.”  In August 1831 Turner led insurgent slaves in a march across 
Southampton County, Virginia, slaying whites as they advanced before be-
ing overpowered by the planter-organized white militia.
Large-scale rebellion disproved the white South’s facile claims about 
Black “contentment,” but their ruthless suppression was carefully staged 
in order to instill terror in the slave quarters. Twenty-six slaves were hung 
alongside Gabriel on Richmond’s public gallows aer the plot was exposed. 
Up to sixty-six slave insurgents were killed in bale in Louisiana and more 
than thirty sentenced to death, their heads severed and “stuck on poles…
along the river levee from New Orleans to LaPlace in an aempt to discour-
age similar rebellions.” At Charleston more than 130 (including four whites) 
were arrested; Vesey and thirty-four others were publicly hung in front of 
an “immense crowd” of “white as well as black,” and another thirty-one were 
deported to Cuba. Weeks aer the suppression of Nat Turner’s rebellion, au-
thorities were continuing to report the “the slaughter of many blacks without 
trial and under circumstances of great barbarity.” e number of slaves mur-
dered in retribution was certainly in the hundreds.20 
Everywhere the reaction against the insurrectionary threat included 
harsh new restrictions on the slave community: at Charleston alone this in-
volved the imposition of a nightly curfew that would remain in place through 
the war, strict surveillance of the free Black community, tight regulation of 
the “hiring out” system (including the wearing of “slave badges”) and a ban 
on public assembly, construction of the state arsenal (which later became 
e Citadel military academy), the forced exile of inuential religious lead-
ers, and the automatic incarceration of Black seamen coming into the port. 
irty years later a visiting abolitionist concluded, aer hearing a Charleston 
slave insist that the Blacks “wants to be free very bad . . . and may be will 
ght before long if they don’t get freedom somehow,” that they were astute 
enough to hold o until they had some prospect of success. “ey know 
and they dread the slaveholders’ power [and] are afraid to assail it without 
rst eecting a combination among themselves.” is was the predicament 
confronting slaves across the antebellum South: their calculations about the 
feasibility of open rebellion were informed by a keen—and rational—appre-
ciation of their masters’ overwhelming power.21 
Slaves were acutely aentive to any shi in the political winds, and the 
national crisis that began to intensify in the early 1850s presented them with 
new opportunities. e 1856 presidential election, heralding the emergence 
of antislavery politics through the candidacy of John C. Frémont, antago-
nized proslavery whites in the same proportion as it aroused the hopes of 
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watchful slaves. Among the escaped slaves who would later enlist in the 
Union military was Florida-born Prince Lamkin, who claimed that slaves 
there had “expected all this war ever since Frémont’s time.” Another veteran 
recalled that upon landing ashore with the 54th Massachuses (Colored) 
Regiment, Blacks in lowcountry South Carolina informed him “there had 
been a conspiracy hatching among the slaves, as far back as 1856, the year 
Frémont was up for the Presidency.”22 One of the most illuminating ante-
bellum slave memoirs—from the Tennessee-based agitator William Webb—
oers evidence of the clear link between the intrusion of the slavery con-
troversy into national politics and a sharp increase in grassroots agitation 
among the slaves. “ere arose a great trouble in the Southern States, about 
Frémont running for President,” Webb recalled. “[White Southerners] com-
menced having great meetings . . . saying the streets would run with blood 
before the North should rule.”
e name of Frémont sounded in every colored person’s heart [and] meant free-
dom to them. ey held great meetings, and had speeches among themselves, 
in secret. ey knew if the slave-holders heard about them holding meetings it 
would be death to them. And when Frémont ran and was defeated, a great anger 
arose among the colored people, but the slave-holders were rejoiced. en the 
slaves began to study how they would get free. . . . ey would make speeches 
among themselves . . . about what steps they would take. Some would speak about 
rebelling and killing, and some would speak, and say, “wait for the next four years.” 
ey said they felt as if the next President would set the colored people free.23
Lincoln would be late in assuming this role, but reports from across the 
South show that slaves everywhere shared Webb’s deep conviction about the 
meaning of the war and the trajectory along which events were moving. Lam-
kin recalled “the secret anxiety of slaves to know about the election of Pres. 
Lincoln, & their all refusing to work on March 4th,” the date of Lincoln’s rst 
inauguration. “e negroes are all of opinion that Lincoln is to come here to 
free them,” a plantation mistress at Charleston complained when election re-
sults became known. Near Pensacola slaves presented themselves to the com-
mand at Fort Pickens even before the war began, “entertaining the idea,” in 
one ocer’s words, that federal troops “were placed here to protect them and 
grant them their freedom.”24 A year aer the outbreak of war the situation had 
become far more explosive. New Orleans planters reported that there were “a 
great many Negroes out in the woods [who] think Old Lincoln is ghting for 
them.” Aer her husband went o to join the Confederates, a Texas mistress 
complained that her slaves were “doing nothing,” and that “nearly all the Ne-
groes around here are at it,” with some “geing so high on anticipation of the 
glorious freedom by the Yankees that they resist a whipping.” e coming of 
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war had dramatically expanded the possibilities for slave resistance and, as 
Du Bois insisted, those held in bondage across the South would watch impa-
tiently for opportunities to assert their claim to freedom.25
Confederate mobilization opens the breach
e rst signicant openings for slave self-assertion were created not by a 
benevolent Lincoln administration, nor even by Union Army ocers who 
would later come to play a crucial role, but by the Confederacy. e supreme 
paradox of the bloody, four-year conict is that the South’s ability to prose-
cute the war was completely dependent on impressed slave labor. From the 
construction of fortications around Charleston harbor at the outset of the 
war to the “monuments to negro labor” in the trenchworks and artillery in-
stallations essential to the defense against General George McClellan’s Pen-
insula Campaign in the spring and summer of 1862, impressed slaves played 
an indispensable role in sustaining the war-making capacity of the Confeder-
acy.26 But in a war organized to prolong their own enslavement, Black labor-
ers could be pressed into military work only so long as Confederates wielded 
the necessary coercive power, and by the summer of 1862 there were signs 
that the system was collapsing under the strains of war.
“e credit of having rst conquered their prejudices against the employ-
ment of Blacks,” the antislavery editor Horace Greely conceded, “is fairly due 
to the rebels.” Reports that impressed slave labor bolstered the Confederacy 
began to gure prominently in abolitionist appeals for Black military enlist-
ment in the North. “If Abraham Lincoln does not have the negro on his side,” 
Wendell Phillips told an audience in the spring of 1862, “Jeerson Davis will 
have him on his.”27 But in deploying slaves as military laborers through-
out the South, Confederate ocials opened a perilous breach in slavery’s 
defenses. e organization of an elaborate system for transporting laborers 
back and forth across the region—mainly from the interior of the Gulf and 
seaboard states toward the vulnerable coast—presented serious problems 
for slaveholders and military ocials alike. Among other things, the trac 
brought news and intelligence to slaves in remote plantation districts about 
the blows being inicted on their “invincible” masters by Lincoln’s military. 
Planters across the South were concerned that slaves coming back from 
the labor camps “returned to the plantation with new and dangerous ideas 
which they imparted to the other slaves . . . complicating the problem of con-
trol and discipline at home.”28
As early enthusiasm for war among southern whites began to wane, 
planters increasingly resented the military’s continual intrusions on their 
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prerogative, and withdrew their cooperation. Compelled to work under 
horric, oen lethal conditions, slave laborers escaped in droves, eeing to 
the interior or—when they were within range—making a break for Union 
lines. By late 1862 the impressment system was on the verge of collapse, and 
chronic labor shortages began to seriously impact on the Confederacy’s 
war-making capacity. e war launched to make slavery permanent and un-
assailable was unleashing the very forces that would bring it crashing down.
Slave consciousness: a varying and uid context
Even in his brief elaboration of the scope of the slaves’ “general strike,” Du Bois 
was careful to acknowledge the uneven character of slave consciousness and 
opportunity during the war. e evidence accumulated over the past gen-
eration allows a more precise assessment—one that reveals regional varia-
tion and change over time in a uid military situation, conrming the slaves’ 
agency but also the substantial limitations on their ability to shape events. 
Frederick Douglass wrote that during the war abolitionists in the North vac-
illated “between the dim light of hope and the gloomy shadow of despair,” 
and that condition—rooted in the excruciating gap between aspiration and 
possibility—must have been even more pronounced among the four million 
slaves chang under Confederate rule in the midst of a war over slavery.29 
At the most basic level, dierences in consciousness emanated from the 
humanity of the slaves themselves. “e four million slaves of the South were 
not homogenous either in condition or outlook,” Bruce Levine has argued. 
ey made their calculations about how to take advantage of the war in a va-
riety of seings, and “like any section of humanity, displayed a wide range of 
personalities. Some were quick; others were not. Some were audacious, oth-
ers were not. . . . Some aended closely as possible to political news; others 
simply accepted that their lot, whatever its rights and wrongs, was xed and 
unchangeable.”30 On top of this were piled a wide range of circumstances 
across the region that could either encourage or deter collective action. 
e “grapevine telegraph”—the scaolding of slave organization—was 
remarkably ecient in transmiing news and intelligence across much of 
the South, but there were considerable gaps as well. Slaves in cities and mar-
ket towns or those brought into early contact with Union occupation had 
lile trouble keeping abreast of developments, and played a critical role in 
moving information along waterways, roads, and railroad lines deep into the 
interior. But large swathes of the plantation South remained cut o and iso-
lated, even aer the war’s end. Early in the war, an older study concluded, 
“Except in invaded regions, and in areas near the Federal lines, the war seems 
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not to have wrought any great changes in the life to which the slaves were 
accustomed.” In the late-seled coon frontier of southwest Georgia, Su-
san O’Donovan found in her recent work that the outbreak of war “barely 
stirred [the] slaves,” and “antebellum rhythms of . . . life remained largely 
intact.” Even there, though, war was eroding the planters’ control: they wor-
ried about sending their impressed slaves to labor in Savannah, where “the 
negroes are [as] fully informed on the [war] as we are.”31 
e paern of antebellum slave insurgency suggests that urban areas 
and districts home to long-established slave communities allowed greater 
space for large-scale clandestine organization than isolated rural districts. It 
was oen militant slaves in the port cities—brought into contact with the 
wider Atlantic world—who managed to give a lead to the struggles of planta-
tion laborers in the surrounding countryside, a trend that persisted through 
the war and beyond into Reconstruction. With Union naval and land forces 
pressing upon the coast and occupying strategic territory from early in the 
war, signicant disparities became evident in the relative position of slave 
communities along the coast and those in the interior. e Union’s capture 
of Port Royal on November 1861 made the South Carolina Sea Islands a bea-
con for escaping slaves from three surrounding states, with Beaufort earning 
a reputation as a “Negro heaven”; the taking of New Orleans six months later 
detonated a slave rebellion across southern Louisiana from which planters 
never recovered. Large-scale slave movement—a kind of heaving before 
slavery’s coming disintegration—was concentrated along the coast until 
Union forces began to win strategic victories up and down the Mississippi, 
culminating in Ulysses S. Grant’s triumph at Vicksburg in July of 1863, which 
accelerated the collapse of slavery in the Mississippi Valley.  
is close correlation between Union military advances and the expand-
ing scope of Black freedom is an essential feature, though it has to be empha-
sized that the dynamic operated in both directions. Early on, for example, the 
northern command regarded Port Royal as a prize mainly because of the role 
it could play as a fueling station for their Atlantic blockade eet. It was the 
continual insistence of slaves and a handful of allies in the Union military that 
the area might more advantageously serve as a beachhead for dismantling 
slavery that allowed Union forces there by early 1863 to begin to inict heavy 
blows against the heartland of secession. A similar dynamic was evident else-
where. Leading military historians have aempted, recently, to draw a sharp—
and articial—distinction between preserving the Union and emancipation 
as war aims.32 But it was only the transformation of the war into an armed 
antislavery crusade that made defeat of the slaveholders’ rebellion possible, 
and that transformation was inconceivable without the slaves’ leading role.
ISR_100.indb   59 1/31/16   4:56 PM
60            International Socialist Review
Convergence: Union war aims and slave aspirations
How might we understand slave self-activity during the war in such a way 
that acknowledges both the leading role they played, as a class, in transform-
ing the war and the highly uneven levels of consciousness and circumstance 
that characterized the slave South? Steven Hahn, a leading historian of US 
slave emancipation whose A Nation Under Our Feet makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of grassroots Black mobilization in the 
rural South, has argued that there is “good reason” to regard the slaves during 
wartime as “discrete, ever-developing political and military bodies moving 
in and out of alliances as the circumstances of power and politics allowed.”33 
But such an approach ascribes a high level of coherence, uniformity, and 
premeditation to a process that was more complex and uneven, and one in 
which constraints on slave assertion varied widely from one locale to an-
other, sometimes changing dramatically in a maer of weeks, days, or even 
hours. Consider, for example, the tragic nal days in the life of Amy Spain, 
the sixteen-year-old slave who ventured out to publicly cheer on Sherman’s 
troops as they took Darlington, South Carolina, in the spring of 1865, but 
who met her death on the gallows a few days later, aer the Union Army had 
moved on and Confederates retook the town.34 
e abolitionist James Redpath’s observations in the urban South on 
the cusp of war convey the unevenness in the slaves’ predicament and the 
caution they had to exercise in determining whether and when to shi from 
“watching and waiting” to open, collective deance. “At Richmond and Wilm-
ington,” he reported, “I found the slaves discontented, but despondingly 
resigned to their fate,” while at Charleston they struck him as “morose and 
savagely brooding over their wrongs.” ere, he was convinced, the slaves’ 
hesitation would dissolve with an open declaration of war: “[I]f the roar of 
hostile cannon was to be heard by the slaves, or a hostile eet was seen sail-
ing up the bay,” he predicted, “then . . . would the sewers of the city be in-
stantly lled with the blood of the slave masters.” Redpath’s judgment on the 
varying disposition among slaves in the urban South is worth noting, even 
if he underestimated the obstacles to open rebellion in Charleston, where it 
was only in the nal weeks of the war that Union military success rendered 
it possible for the city’s Black majority to show their hand. In the early stages 
of the war, at least, slaves in Richmond—the Confederate capital—thought 
it inconceivable that their masters might come out on the losing end, and 
acted accordingly: “ousands of Troops were Sent to Richmond from all 
parts of the country,” one recalled, so that it “appeared to be an impossiability, 
to us, Colored people, that they could ever be conquord.”35
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On the issue of slave “contrabands,” too, it makes sense to acknowledge 
a wide disparity in circumstances. It is no doubt true, as Hahn suggests, that 
the contraband camps served, in part, as “schools of citizenship”—the stag-
ing sites for a vibrant political discourse among fugitive slaves. But the same 
camps were also—and perhaps more oen—hosts to epidemic misery, des-
titution, violence, and death. Despite the paternalism he brought to his work 
in organizing relief in the Mississippi Valley, Superintendent of Contrabands 
for the Department of the Tennessee John Eaton is credible in describing 
the situation he confronted as the camps lled with refugees.36 As word of 
Union military advances spread via the slave telegraph across the Western 
eater, the military faced a steady ow of escaping slaves seeking refuge be-
hind Union lines. 
ese escaping slaves make up a large number of those included by Du Bois 
as having taken part in the “general strike,” and gure in more recent accounts 
emphasizing slave deliberation. But as Eaton aests, the sequence by which 
slaves made their way to the camps varied. As Union control over the region 
tightened, probably a majority came in on their own volition through a more 
or less organized process of ight and escape. But Eaton points out that in 
the early period camp commanders were oen compelled to bring in under 
military protection those who’d been le to fend for themselves by masters 
deserting their plantations in the face of advancing Union forces. Made up 
overwhelmingly of the elderly and the inrm, “encumbered” women and 
their young children, this early majority had, according to Eaton, “become 
so completely broken down in spirit, through suering” that “it was almost 
impossible to arouse them.”37 His grim account suggests the need to dier-
entiate between those slaves in a position to actively pursue emancipation 
and those carried along by events beyond their control.
In light of these circumstances, which prevailed well beyond the Mis-
sissippi Valley, does it make sense to regard slaves as a discrete element in the 
war? e relationship between slaves and the Union military is complicated, 
but it seems incontestable that the dynamics set in motion during a pro-
tracted war brought about an increasing convergence of interests. e cri-
sis that generated new openings for slave self-assertion did not come about 
simply because whites had “fallen out” with one another, as some have sug-
gested: the fact that it was over the question of slavery that the Republican-led 
North and the slaveholder-led Confederacy came to blows was hugely sig-
nicant. Union forces beneted in tangible and important ways from slave 
intelligence, from their labor in the camps, and eventually from Black mili-
tary service, but the relationship worked both ways: it is dicult to see how 
the slaves’ room for maneuver could have been so dramatically expanded 
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absent the strategic military advances won by the Union military. In this re-
spect, it makes more sense to delineate the increasing convergence of Union 
war aims and slave aspirations rather than to view the slaves as a discrete or 
self-standing entity negotiating a series of pragmatic, ever-shiing alliances. 
ere are, to be sure, striking examples of autonomous or semi-auton-
omous slave organization in which particular communities negotiated their 
relationship with the Union military on their own terms. In his biography 
of Abraham Galloway, David S. Cecelski recounts the experience of Edward 
Kinsley, a white recruiter aached to the Massachussets 45th Colored Infan-
try, who was initially unsuccessful in trying to convince Black North Car-
olinians to enlist until the spring of 1863, when he was invited to a Black-
owned boarding house in New Bern, blindfolded and led to a room in the 
aic where Galloway and others interviewed him at gunpoint. ere they
 put him under a solemn oath, that any colored man enlisting in North Carolina 
should have the same pay as their colored brethren enlisted in Massachuses; 
their families should be provided for; their children should be taught to read; 
and if they should be taken prisoners, the government should see to it that they 
were treated as prisoners of war. 
Kinsley agreed, and “the next day the word went forth, Blacks came to the 
recruiting stations by the hundreds and a brigade was soon formed.”38
e New Bern episode is a powerful example of an organized aempt by 
slaves and the recently freed to steer events, and there are others. Galloway’s 
counterpart in the Mississippi Valley, William Webb, recalls the establish-
ment of elaborate networks of slave resistance across parts of Tennessee be-
fore the war; by late 1862 these extended south into Mississippi and northern 
Louisiana and north into Kentucky. In his suggestions for expanding organi-
zation throughout the Mississippi Valley, readers of Webb’s autobiography 
are aorded a rare glimpse of the logistics of the slave telegraph: during clan-
destine meetings with coconspirators Webb advocated “establish[ing] a king 
in every State, and let every king make his laws in his own State, and let his 
place be the headquarters. I thought it best for each king to appoint a man 
to travel twelve miles, and then hand the news to another man, and so on, 
till the news reached from Louisiana to Mississippi.” Winthrop Jordan un-
earthed the bones of a slave conspiracy in Adams County, Mississippi, that 
began within four weeks of the outbreak of war, with news and intelligence 
likely traveling along the route laid down by Webb and others. By early May 
1861 local whites were reporting that “a great many carriage drivers” in and 
around Natchez seemed to be implicated in a conspiracy known simply as 
“e Plan.” In her study of the Bale of Milliken’s Bend, Linda Barnickel 
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conrms that leaders of similar covert networks played a crucial role in re-
cruiting slaves into Union ranks in the spring and summer of 1863.39 
e dynamics evident at New Bern and in parts of the Mississippi Valley 
in the rst half of 1863 were by no means exceptional, but neither do they 
typify relations between escaped slaves and the Union Army, much less 
represent conditions universal among slaves across the Confederacy. At the 
other end of the spectrum we have credible testimony from slaves living on 
remote plantations that word of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation never 
reached them until aer the war, that in some places even aer word arrived 
at the war’s end that they were freed, laborers felt so intimidated by their 
former masters’ presence that they refrained from celebrating or marking the 
occasion in any way—even though, as one put it—their “joy was unspeak-
able.”40 We have testimony from planters as late as August and September of 
1865 expressing their resentment that just now—four or ve months aer the 
surrender at Appomaox—they were being compelled by northern troops 
to inform laborers on their plantations that they were no longer slaves. All of 
this rearms the conspicuous unevenness that Du Bois pointed out in his 
compelling but qualied assertion about the “slaves’ general strike.”
Conclusion: The slave vanguard 
in an army of emancipation 
“When Northern armies entered the South they became armies of emancipa-
tion,” Du Bois wrote: “It was the last thing they planned to be.”41 Both sides 
of that assessment are worth bearing in mind. Before his election and into 
the second year of the war, Lincoln publicly disavowed at every opportunity 
any intention to tamper with slavery where it already existed. is was a key 
element in his rst inaugural address, and here it makes sense to take Lin-
coln at his word—he had “no purpose to interfere with slavery in the States 
where it exists” at this point and “no inclination to do so.” e determination 
to exclude slavery from northern strategy in the early phase of the war—to 
“spare the enemy’s most vulnerable spot”—profoundly aected its early con-
duct. Although he refrained from aributing the North’s poor military per-
formance in the early period of the war to political weaknesses alone, Karl 
Marx acknowledged in the summer of 1862 that “In part, the military causes 
of the crisis are connected with the political ones.”42 
ere are complex strategic considerations in the debate over military 
strategy during the rst year and a half of the war, but arguably Lincoln’s 
aempt to conciliate the border states by—as General George McClellan 
put it—continually “dodg[ing] the nigger question” merely delayed the day 
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of reckoning, at a cost of tens of thousands of lives. Lincoln’s early reluctance 
to link slave emancipation and restoration of the Union, his determination 
that the war should not—in his own words—“degenerate into a violent and 
remorseless revolutionary struggle,” won him the (temporary) admiration 
of the inept, unapologetic racist McClellan, who declared the early Lincoln 
“perfectly honest and . . . really sound on the nigger question.” For Marx and 
for many of the most astute abolitionists, the president’s  “anxious regard 
for the wishes, advantages, interests of the [border states] blunted the Civil 
War’s point of principle and . . . deprived it of its soul.”43 In a speech delivered 
near his home in Rochester, New York on the Fourth of July in 1862, Fred-
erick Douglass was scathing in his criticism of the Republican leadership in 
Washington who, “with all its admied wisdom and sagacity, uerly failed 
for a long time to comprehend the nature and extent” of the war. e Lin-
coln administration had thus far “fought the rebels with the Olive branch,” 
he wrote. “e people must teach them to ght them with the sword”:    
 [S]lavery is the life of the rebellion. Let the loyal army but inscribe upon its 
banner, Emancipation and protection to all who will rally under it, and no power 
could prevent a stampede from slavery, such as the world has not witnessed 
since the Hebrews crossed the Red Sea. I am convinced that this rebellion and 
slavery are twin monsters, that they must fall or ourish together, and that all 
aempts at upholding one while puing down the other, will be followed by 
continued trains of darkening calamities. . . .44
Lincoln’s slow but sure conversion to an antislavery war was brought 
about in part by the impossibility of defeating his Confederate adversaries 
through the tidy, limited war he set out to oversee in April 1861. Aer the 
scale of the disastrous failure of McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign became 
clear in the summer of 1862, a New York Tribune correspondent concluded, 
perceptively, “that it is uerly impossible for us to subdue the rebels without 
an alliance with their slaves.”45 By this time the northern public—and Lin-
coln himself—were moving rapidly toward the same conclusion.
It was the relentless insistence of the slaves and their allies that revolu-
tionary war was the only way forward that brought purpose and soul to the 
Union cause in the Civil War, and which more than any other factor drove 
the war’s transformation into a revolutionary confrontation with the slave 
system. Du Bois was the rst prominent historian to assert this publicly, and 
he did so without equivocating. We don’t have to view slaves as acting com-
pletely on their own or independently of the Union military to acknowledge 
their leading role. Du Bois didn’t do so in his own work, and in important 
ways such an approach gets in the way of a nuanced understanding of the 
ways in which the northern bourgeoisie’s limited revolution from above 
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converged with, and was pushed forward by, the slaves’ revolution from be-
low. As Ira Berlin has put it, “Slaves were the prime movers in the emancipa-
tion drama, not the sole movers. ey set others in motion, including many 
who never would have moved if le to their own devices.”46
In insisting that their own emancipation was the central question at stake 
during the Civil War, the slaves—the South’s “revolutionary class”—opened 
up a new struggle over the meaning of freedom. In some ways the conclusion 
of the war marked the beginning, and not the end, of the contest over free-
dom’s meaning. Union victory would see the slaves freed, but very quickly it 
would become clear that the cramped vision of freedom embraced by the tri-
umphant Northern bourgeoisie—wielding power through the Republican 
Party—fell far short of the aspirations of freed slaves. e government “felt 
that it had done enough” for the slaves, Douglass recalled. “It had made him 
free, and henceforth he must make his own way in the world [and] ‘Root, 
pig, or die’.” With “neither property, money, nor friends,” the former slaves 
were “free from the old plantation” but le with “nothing but the dusty road” 
under their feet.47 An Arkansas freedman pleaded with Union army ocers 
in early 1866 that he needed “some land. I am helpless; you do nothing for 
me but give me freedom.” Another ex-slave complained bierly in the same 
vein, that she was le at the end of the war with “freedom, and a hungry belly.” 
eir new predicament would in some ways embody the stark disparity be-
tween promise and reality that characterized the lives of workers generally 
under capitalism. In the bier struggle that commenced with emancipation, 
the former slaves would reassert their claim to an expansive freedom, com-
pelling their Northern “liberators” to choose between following through on 
a commitment to thoroughgoing equality or retreating toward an accommo-
dation with the spirit of the slave South.48
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